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INCE 1982, sharp declines in real farm income
and the asset values supporting over 8200 billion in
farm debt have created substantial increases in farm
loan defaults and far-rn bank failures, Large and ira-
cr’easing loan losses have generated a great deal of
concern that the rapidly deteriorating quality of farm
debt may have severe consequences for the long-term
str-uctur’e of American agriculture and adverse shor’t-
term effects on the aggregate economy as well,’
This ar-tide reviews a variety of performance indica-
tors for the three major lenders to the farm sector’arid
assesses both the timing and breadth of portfolio
deterioration. The lending institutions examined are
agricultural banks, the F’arm Credit System IF’CSI and
the Farmer’s Home Administration Il-’rttHAl, ‘the per’—
Michael T Belong/a is asenioreconom/standKenneth C. Carrarois an
economistat the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. James C. Polefti
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St. Louis, Lyle Stucki of the Farm Credit Banks of Louisville, David
Meads of the FmHA, and Arnold Miller of the Farm Credit Admin-
istration,
‘Estimates of farm loan defaults under different scenarios arepro-
vided by Bullock (1985). Ranges commonly cited for losseson all
farm loans are$25—SO billion overthe next fouryears. Losses within
the FarmCredit System alone have beenestimated to be$350—400
million in 1985 with additional losses in 1986. Also, an estimated 12
percent of the Farm Credit System’s loans are not adequately
secured by property and assets and could produce “significant”
future losses; see “Farm Agency Estimates” (1985).
Schink and Urbanchuck 11985) describe the channels through
which farm loan defaults could affect interest rates, GNP and
employment and estimate these effects for different magnitudes of
loan losses, An alternative assessment of how farm loan defaults
might affect the aggregate economy is provided by Belongia and
Gilbert (1985).
forrnance of these tender’s in the Eighth Federal Re-
serve Distr’ict is compared with their- per-formance in
the rest of the United States.
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An agricultural bank is defined as a commercial
bank with a r-atio of farm loans to total loans that is
above the average farm loan ratio at alt banks. At the
end of 1984, the average far-ni loan ratio was approxi-
mately 17 per’cent. Currently, there are 589 banks in
the “official” boundaries ofthe Eighth F’ederal Reserve
District and 1,383 agr’icultural banks in the region
defined more broadly that have a higher’ fitr’m loan
ratio and meet the current definition of an agricultural
bank. ‘l’he broader’ definition of the Eighth Distr’ict is
used to make comnpar-isons with Farm Credit Bank
districts,z Figur’e I r-epi-esents these alternative desig-
nations ofthe Distr-ict’s border’s.
Nationally, 4,970banks, or 35 percent of all commer-
cial banks are defined to be agr’icultur’al banks. Collec-
tively, they hold 830 billion, or- 60 percent, of the total
farm debt held by commer’cial banks, Of the far-rn debt
held by agricultur-al banks, 83 per-cent 1524.8 billionl is
rOfficiarly, the Eighth Federal Reserve District includes Arkansas,
northern Mississippi, southern Illinois and Indiana, western Ken-
tucky and Tennessee and eastern Missouri, Farm Credit districts,
however, cover entire states. The Fourth and Sixth Farm Credit
districts, headquartered in Louisville and St. Louis, do not include
Mississippi but cover all of the remaining states and Ohio, To
provide arepresentative, but unofficial Eighth District, wedefine it as
the states covered by the Fourth and Sixth Farm Credit districts:
Arkansas, Irlinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio and Tennes-
see, Comparisons with the nation refer to data for all states other
than thoseincluded in this definition ofthe Eighth District.
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Figure 1
Official Eighth District ~iatst’
F ~ area used to represent the Eighth
Dktrict for this article includes the 4th
and 6th Farm Credit Districts of Louisville
and St. Louis and is bounded by the
heavy black line.
l”lCBs function as intermediaries that package these
loanable funds for-, as of October 1985, 318 Production
Credit Associations IPCAsI, who icr tur’n, make loans
directly to farmer-s for’annual oper’ating expenses. ‘l’lie
FLBs make loans to farmer’s for’ the pur-chase of far’m—
land thr’or.rgh a raetwor-k of 390 F’eder’al Land Bank
Associations that firnction as loan originating offices.
Banks for Cooper-atives mnake loans to farmer-—owned
cooper-atives, such as sirpply stores. As of December’
31, 1984, the Farm Credit System, exclusive of the
Banks for- Cooper-atives, held $67.9 billion, or’ 32 per-
cent, of total far-m debt, Of this total, FLBs held $49.1
billion and PCAs held $17.9 billion. FICBs held the
remaining $0.9 billion in the form of loans to other
financial institutions.
The Far-rners Home Administration IFmHAI is the
so-called “lender oflast r-esor’t” to far-mers. It extends
credit to far-rner-s thr-ough dir-ect loans, guarantees of
farm loans made and serviced by coniriiercial banks,
and variosrs eniergency loan pr-ograrris. FmHA, for- the
most par-t, lends to far-rner-s when they have tr-ouble
servicingdebt acquir-ed fiom other lenders or if credit
is riot available at ‘reasonable” interest r’ates from
their- cur-rent lender-s. As of 1984, FmHA held $25.7
billion, or- 12 percent, of total farm debt.
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non-real estate debt, or’ oper-ating debt, associated
with the variable costs of far-rn pr-oduction. Because
farm lending by commer-cial banks is pr-imanly for-
short-term opet-ating debt, their- chief sour-ce of com-
petition is the Production Cr-edit Associations IPCAsI
of the Far-rn Credit System.
The cooperative Far-rn Credit System IFCSI is a sys-
tem offederally charter-ed, but privately owned, banks
and associations, which ar-c or-ganized as cooper-a—
tives, These banks are supervised and examined bythe
Far-rn Cr-edit Adrninisti-ation, an independent agency
ofthe United States gover-ninent, and ar-c mandated by
their- charter to make loans only for’ pun-poses directly
related to agr-icultur-e. The FCS consists of 12 districts
arid 37 banks: 12 Federal Land Banks IFLBsI, 12 Federal
triter-mediate Credit Banks IFfCB5I and 13 Bamiks for
Cooper-atives IBCsI.
‘t’he F’CSobtains loanable funds bythe sale of secur-i—
ties thr-ough the system’s Wall Street firriding ar-ni, the
F’ecler-al I”ar’rn Cr-edit Banks Funding Corpor-ation. ‘the
A convenient place to begin a r-eview of far-rn debt
holdings and pr-oblenis is an analysis of trencis in
loans outstanding at the var-ious lender’s. Table I
pr-esents the mar-ket shar-es of nori-r’eal estate agr’icul-
tin-al debt held by the major lerader-s since 1970 fur’
both the Eighth Distr-ict, br-oadly defined, and for- the
remainder of the U.S. Non-r-eal estate debt r’epresents
financing forannual oper-ating expenses such as feed,
fertilizer- and seed, as well as for the purchase of far-rn
machinery and livestock, The category of -‘All Others”
includes such lender’s as private individuals, dealer-s
and merchants.
‘I’he trends in the District and the United States are
r-oughiv par-allel and indicate that both commercial
banks and the FCS gained their- highest rnar-ket shares
in the mid—1970s and until recently have been steadily
losing market share to the F’mHA. By the end of t984,
commercial banks at both the District and national
levels r-ever’sed the 10—year downtn-enid, showing sig-
nificant mar-ket shar’e gains over’ 1983.
Table 2 pr-esents the mar-ken shan’es held by lender-s
for farm real estate loans, The lender category of ‘‘In-
sun-er-s’ has been added to r’eflect the significant pies-
18Table 1
Farm Non-Real-Estate Debt Outstanding at Major Lenders
(percent of market held by each lender)
Banks PCAs FmHA All Others
U.S. District U.S. District U.S. District U.S. District
1970 434°- 431% ‘91% 22.5% 35% 26% 340% 318%
1971 461 45.7 222 256 35 26 283 261
1972 462 434 223 262 30 22 285 282
1973 486 462 219 280 28 21 268 238
1974 51.7 468 230 285 27 20 225 226
1975 500 464 256 30.8 29 24 215 203
1976 491 440 25.1 316 43 40 215 204
1977 487 44.1 243 315 40 33 230 21 1
1978 438 413 216 296 57 36 289 255
1979 406 413 20.3 29.6 92 46 298 245
1980 385 391 217 298 12.0 75 278 236
1981 36.6 360 22.5 783 144 103 265 254
1982 34.4 337 21.5 281 155 133 286 249
1983 339 337 195 202 ~39 135 328 326
1984 375 397 191 184 14.0 150 29.3 270
NOTE Due no rounding, percentages may not add to 100
SOURCE U S. Department of Agrrrulture
Table 2
Farm Real Estate Debt Outstanding at Major Lenders
(percent of market held by each lender)
Banks FLBs FmHA Insurers All Others
U.S. District U.S. District U.S. District U.S. District U.S. District
1970 103% 18.9% 23 1% 21 9% 79% 74% 197% 194% 390% 324%
1971 105 195 239 221 81 77 186 181 388 327
1972 11 1 206 250 22.5 8.2 78 175 166 38.2 325
1973 115 216 26.5 233 82 75 163 151 375 325
1974 115 224 284 246 78 71 155 137 36.9 32.3
1975 110 220 307 276 73 68 147 120 363 316
1976 104 211 327 301 69 64 143 110 357 314
1977 9.9 209 340 316 68 51 141 ~08 352 306
1978 98 208 342 323 65 56 146 115 348 297
1979 96 199 348 333 60 51 152 128 343 289
1980 82 16.? 349 339 85 78 146 130 338 286
1981 75 149 379 366 62 76 137 129 32.6 280
1982 64 133 417 398 84 80 125 20 310 269
1983 63 ‘26 43.7 410 83 84 118 115 300 265
1984 70 133 437 402 82 89 115 110 296 266
NOTE Due to rounuing oe’centages nay not add to 100
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ence of anumber- ofinsun’ance companies in far-miand
lending. The “All Other’s” category for real estate lend-
ing mainly repr-esents debt held by individuals. The
tn-ends ar-c again consistent across the Distr-ict and the
United States. Although commer-cial banks in the Dis—
trict hold a lan-ger- share of the farm n-cal estate debt
than banks in the r-emainden- of the U.S., banks in both
ar-eas have seen steady declines in rnarket shar-e after’
initial gains in the ear-hi 1970s, lnsurance companies
and the category of’”i~llOthers” also have exhibited
secular’ declines in mar-ket share in both ar-eas. The
share losses ofthese three lender gr-oups haveaccrued
almost entirely to the Feder-al Land Banks of the h-CS.
At both the Disttict and U.S. levels, the FCS has riearly
doubled its man-ket share with steady gr-owth over the
period since 1970. ‘the FmHA share, however-, has
remained largely unchanged over the same period,
although minor-gains ar-c evident in the Distr-ict.
tn summary, the mar’ketshare data indicate that, for
far-rn operating debt, the FrnHAhas posted shar-p gains
since the rnid-1970s at the expense of comrner’cial
banks and the PCAs. The farm real estate mar-ket,
however, has been dotmnated by the shar’p gains
made by the Fedenal Land Banks r-elative to the share
losses ofmost other major fan’m lenders.
~ ~nJ:~s OF flflq9~ ~ OtJAL~I1Y
The major causes of the recent farm debt defaults
are erroneous forecasts — both by farmers arid tlieir
creditors of continued high and acceler-atinig hi-
flation and increased r-eal r’etur-ns to assets eniiploved
in agriculture.’ So long as land pr-ices continued to n-ise
with inflation, the collater-al base against which
farmers could but-row increased, and the value of
dollars used to repay the debt decreased. In conjunc-
tion with tax advantages for land ownership and the
availability of subsidized credit for’ land purchases, it
made sense to buy fanniilanid at prices of $3,000—84,000
per acie — ifthe purchaser believed the land could be
resold at a higher price. Siriiilar-lv, under’ the expecta-
tion of world food shortages arid increases in r’eal
comniodity prices, the price of land in agricultural
pniiductioni would be expected to rise.’ Under these
conditions, both farmer-s and their- lender-s agr-eed than
extending niiore credit on a r’ising nominal asset base
was a prudent business decision. Utifor’tunately for
both par-ties, however, their’ for-ecasts of inflation and
commodity pr-ices were ser-iously in er-i-or-,
See Benongia (1985).
4See, for example, Will There Be Enough Food?(1981).
This description of events suggests that inistitirtions
who increased their’ lending to agricultur-e shar-plv
between 1974—31 — when inflation, for-eign demand
for-U.S. far-nipr-oducts and r-eal commodity priceswer-e
inicr’easing or- wer-e expected to md-ease shar-plv —
should be experiencing the greatest deter-ior-ation in
portfolio quality.
On the basis of this cr’nter-ron, the Far’m Creclit Svs-
ternand FruHA should beexperiencing r’elativelvmor-e
trouble with por-tfolio per-for-manice than other far-rn
lenders. ‘to assess this thesis, we now tur’ni to a dis-
cussion of riieasur’es of loan quality and por-tfolio
perIor-niance.
~rn”~o~c; nail i:F F! Ba and .FCla
A coniriion measure ofloan quality is the per-cent—
age of loans on which payments are delinquent. This
per-centage tends to be a leading indicator’ ofultimate
loan losses because bor-rower’s who eventually default
on debt fir-st exper-ienice pr-oblems with ruakimig their
scheduled pavriierits. Ifefforts to r-eschedule the loan
arid to service only its ititer-est obligation fail. the
delinquent loan becomes, after some lag, a loan loss.
The data r-equir-ed for this analysis are difficult to
obtain arid are not entir-ely conipar-able acr-oss differ—
erit lender-s and even across differ-emit geographical
ar-eas for the sariie lender gr-oup. The shaded inser’t
discusses the data used in this ar-tide and sonic cave-
ats that should be exercised when making compar-i—
sons or drawinig infer-enices from these series,
Char-t I plots loan delinquency r-ates for’ El Bs in the
U.S. and the Eighth District, broadly defined chart 2
plots the loan loss series for FLBs. In each case, these
scres ar-C defined to lie the dollar value of loanis on
which payments ar-e deliniqirent or- the dollar’ value of
loan losses as a pen-cent of total loans outstanding.
The FUR series indicate that these institutions have
experienced simnilar’ patten-ns arid rates of loan delin—
(luencies and losses both in the District arid in the
r-eniamnider’ of the U.S. Loan losses at District l-’LBs,
5Markel share dataas aproxy for loan quality should beapplied with
some caution. Moreover, it should be noted that this measure is
bettersuined to long-term land mortgagesthanto short-termoperat-
ing loans. The reasoning is asfollows: If market shareformortgage
lending declined in the 1970s, subsequentportfonioquality might be
improved because fewer new loans (that turned out to be poor
loans) were extended and the old loans carried forward were of
higher quality if, for no other reason, because a larger share of the
principal had been repaid. For annual operating loans, however,
market share in a given year may be unrelated to loan quality. In
fact,the lower interest rates offered by PCAs in much of the 1970s
may have attracted the morecreditworthy farmers,
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however’, have risen slightly mon-c shar-ply than at ELBs
in the r’eriiainder- of the U S.’ Mon-eover-, then-c appeal’s
to be alag ofabout two ~‘ear-siiieach case between the
time delinquencies r’ise shan-plv 119821 arid hater’ n’eveah
thieniselves in higher loan losses 119841. Note, however,
that while the patter’ns of delinquency anr.h loan loss
r’ates have been siniilan-, loan losses have been about
one-tenth of prior’ year’s’ delinquencies. Chant I also
shows that dehinquenc~ t’ates were nearly constant
between 1970—81. Ps-ion to 1981, losses at FLBs ~ves-e
less than two—tenths of one percent of all loans nut—
standing.
PCi~loan delinquency data are riot available on a
consistent basis for both the Distm-ict and the r’eniain—
den’ of the U.S. I-on this reason, only the Distrct delin—
quency data are shown mi chart 3. They also r’eveal a
dramatic micr-ease in delinquency s-ates beginning in
6U.S. and District FLB delinquency rates are derived from Farm
Credit Administration annualreports and include the items of ‘non-
accrual loans” and delinquent principaland advances.
1982. It must be pointed out thiat the absolute levels o:
delinquency a-ates for’ PCAs are not compan-able witl~
the FL8 n-ates pon-tra~edin char’t 1.
Loan loss data (or’ PCAs, however,ar’e available for
both the District and the U.S. amid are pn’esented in
char’t 4. Wnite—ofts in 1984 as a per-cent of total loans
were eight times highien- than the pen’centage in 1981
In contrast to FLU loans, however’, there appean’s to hr
almost rio lag between the time these deli iquenicief
ar-e nepnr’ted and the time they result mi loan losses
‘l’he likely reason for this difference is that PCAs niakn
7District PCA delinquencyrateswere obtained directlyfromthe Farn’
Credit Banks of Louisville and St. Louis on the following basis: for
1970 and 1971 theinformation includesloans30 dayspast due; fror•
1972 to 1983 the information is for loans 60 days past due: the 1984
data are calculated according to the new FCA standards for non
performing loans. The national data available for the 1970 to 198~
period include loans which are termed “loansin process of liquida’
tion” and which are not comparable no the District data. In spite 01
the different nature of the Iwo series, the data exhibit very similar
behavior when plotted against each other on the basis of annua
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loans for an individual year’s operating expenses and
usually schieduhe m’epavmerit shoi’tlv after the yeas-s
lian’est. For this m’eason, unlike the FUlls’ multi-year’
loans forland purchases, PCAs tend to exhibit acloser
short—run r’ehationship between delinquencies and
losses. As in the case of FLBs, it is nlecessan’v to niote
that - while the patten’ns of delinquency arid loan loss
rates are similar’, losses have been one—fifth of
delinquencies.
With t-ising rates of delinquencies and loan
losses one alsowould expect the returns to equity and
assets held by these lender’s to decline, Charts 5
and 6 plot the netul’ns to equity fot FLBs and PCAs,
respectively in the U.S. and the District. In chart 5,
similar patterns for n-eturns in the U.S. and the Dis-
trict are r’evealed wstli the Distrct showing lower
average r’etur’ns since 1979 and a shan-per decline
since the 1982 peak of 10.4 pen-cent. Retur-ns to equity
(or PCAs Fchar’t SF peaked in 1980 for the U.S. atid
1981 for the District and have fallen sharply in just
two years. Returns to assets have followed sini-
ilar patter’ns for these lender-s at both District and
national levels.’.
/Ii7’.rinhhu.ra; Banks
‘the conjecture was that agricultural tianks, which
did not mci-ease nian’ket shar-e ordohlarvolume of farnii
iOans as aggressively mi the 1970s, would show’ some-
what lower’ nreasur’es ofloan delinquencies and losses
and tietter returns to assets and equity than member’s
of the Fan’m Credit System . Anothen’ important factor
supporting this expectatron is the fact that the loan
portfolios of agn-icr.nltun’al banks an’e diver’sified outsiue
of agricultural lending. This loan diven’sit~’ could help
protect batik ear-nings from the wide swings of retuniis
On equity experienced Lw the [“CS lenders who extend
credit only for purposes directly related to agr’icultur-e.
‘.Returns to assets for FLBs peaked in 1982 at 1.12 percentnationally
and .99 percent in theDistrict, By 1984, these valueshad declinedto
.42and —.03 percent, respectively. Between 1981 and 1984, returns








1972 74 76 78 80 82 1984 1970 72 74 76 78 80 82 1984 -2
22.FEDERAL RESERVE SANKOF ST. LOUIS OCTOBER 100
Cho,m 7










































Total Loan Losses as a Percent of Total Loans
Agricunnnnh md Noranric.ntnrrt Banks
Agricultural loan delinquency data have been col-
lected fn’om conimer’ciah banks since 1982. UnIv banks
with total assets gr’eater than $100 million, however.
ar-c required to n’epor’t the volumes of agr-icul tor-al
loans considered in noniaccn-ual or r’eniegotiated sta-
tus. These two categories include loans on which
interest paynienits are riot beingpaid orare being paid
nion-e slowly than originally established. Since a large
niajorrtv of agrncultural banks are smaller’ than $100
million and ther-elon’e do niot n-epor’t nioniacci’uah arid
renegotiated agr’iculton-al loans, chiar’t 7 plots only the
percentage of agricultural production loans that an’e
considered past due by 3Q days or’ more at agn’icultur’al
banks .~These data, then’ehuin’e, i~,n’enot rlin-ectly cornpa-
rable with the PCA data sunimanized earlier in chant 3.
Nonetheless, these limited data suggest that agricul-
tural banks also have experienwed rapid in cr’eases in
‘.Theset ofbanks defined as agricultural banks will change overtime
as the shares of agriculturalloans in somebanks portfolios become
less than or greater than the cutoff point. Over time, however, the
number of agricultural banks has remained fairly constant, ranging
between 5,668 in 1974 and 4,970 in 1984.
delinquent farm debt both in the District and in th
remainder- of the t 1,5,’’.
Loan loss data for’ agn’icuh I un’ah banks pn’ovnde achdi-
tional iniformation to supplement that pn-ovided In
past due rates. Because loan loss clata are not avaihabl(
specifically for’ ags’icultur’al loans, chant 8i saplot of al
loan losses at agr’icultun-al banks and at small nnonagr’i
cultt.rr’al banks in the nation Ihess than 5100 million ir
total assets I expressed as a percentage of all loans aI
these banks since 1976. It indicates that loan losses al
agnicultun’al banks havebeen incr-easing steadily sinc
1979. The rate of increase has been such that tIn
her’cent of loan losses hias r’isen by a factor- of nean’l\
seven since 1979. Losses at connpan’ablv sized nonagr’i
cultun’al banks wer’e Iar-ger than losses at agn’icultun-a
banks until 1981. Now the n-ate of losses at nonagnicul
‘°For the small number of agricultural banks reporting all agriculturn
loan delinquencyitems (29 banks in the District for 1 g84 and 75 i
the remainder of the U.S.), the delinquency rate rose from 4.
percent in 1982 to 9.0 percent in 1984 for the District. In th
remainder of the U.S., however, the overall delinquency rate ros
only from 6.1 percent in 1982 to 6.3 percent in 1984, Given thesma
number of agricultural banks reporting these data, caution in the
interpretation must be used.
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Return on Equity
Agricrhlmrnh and Namngnicnlnrnrah Banks
torah banks is
ttnn’al banks,
only half that experienced by agricul-
loss n’esen’es.’ ‘ ‘l’he latter two items nepresent the n’e—
sources of ahank toabsorb loan losses. At the niational
level, the nounher of agn’ic n.nltu n’ah banks that Fall into
tIw thnn-eatenecl bank category has nearly tn-ipled lion
1982 to I984, going fn’om 76 to 202. In the District,
however-, the number of such threatened institutions
has doubled fr-ow 23 to 46 over the same period. Thus,
concern about rapid inca-eases in farm bank tail tm ‘es,
although certainly important in the Eighth District
appear’s to be even mon’e mlpor’tant for’ institutions
beyond the bonder’s ot the Eighth District
In sinmmam-v, agricultural banks have stnfThn’ed rising
r-ates of delimiquencv arid loan losses and declining
pn-olitahilitv. When cornpared with PCAs, which m-epn’e—
sent their most signiificanit competiton-s in the agr’ieul—
tun’al lending arena, hioweven’, banks appear- to have
survived recent downitur’ns mi the agn’icultur’al econ—
oniv in much better fashion, Although loan loss r’ates
for PCAsand agn-icuhtun’al banks ar-cconipan’abhe, delin—
qttencv n-ates have increased, and pn’ofitability de-
er-eased mon-c qiticklv at PCAs than at agn’ictnltun’al
banks.
‘the k’a,’niens Home .4dmkti/i;-atknrt
‘tine E”mHA’s n’ole as ‘‘lender of last a-eson’t’’ dictates
78 80 82 1984 that its borrower’s an-c from a higli—n-isk category. Loan
delinquency data for both n-eat estate and non—real—
estate farm loans bean’ this out, Charts 10 and 11
document the steady a-ise in delinquency n’ates for’
both loan categor-ies. Compan’isons of delinquency
r’ates at FCS lender-s Ichar-ts 1 and 31 with those of Lhe
F’mFL’~are inistr-uctiye, The FmHA appear-s to have
experieniced rising delinquency rates earlier than 1981
when the ECS lenden-s began to show mar-ked in—
cr-eases in delinquencies. This finding is to be ex-
pected given the char-acter’ of the FmHA’s borrower’
clientele. F’nitlA borrower’s would be more likely to
exhibit n-epavment pr-oblems when a downitur’n in the
agn’icultn.rn’al economy occur’s than would the niore
creditwor’thv bor’n’owem’s of the F’CS or of agn-icultural
baniks, ‘t’hiis also highlights an impon’tant aspect of the
Based on r-etun-nsto equit\’ data at agricultur’aI banks
and at small nonagr’icultur’al banks of the Distn-ict
lchan’t 91, profitability mi tIne Distn’ict peaked hi 1974
and hias been falling steadily since then, with the
exceptions of 1979 and 1980. At the national level,
agn’icultun-ah bank profitability peaked in 1980 befon’e
stan’ting a sharp decline. As in the case of loan losses,
agrculttrn’ah banks’ declining pn’ofitahilitv was greater
than that expen’ieniced 1w nonagr-iet,altur-al banks, Re—
ttrn’nis to equity at Distr’ict agricultural banks have
fallen by nearly 34 per’ceait sitice them’ recent peak in
1979, while tIne r-etun’ns to equity ratio for’ nonagricul-
tural banks in the Distn’ict has fallen by only 16 pen-cent
since 1979,
One fun’then- means of assessing the viability of agri—
cn.nhtur’al banks is by compan’ing the volume of ‘‘risky’’
loans for which repavriients an’e uncertain with a
hank’s ability to abson-h the potential loss. With this in
mind, banks whose viability may be thn-eatened can be
defined as those fbn- which the volume of delinquent
loans exceeds the sum of total bank capital and loan
“The FDIC compilesthe official list of “problem banks” by rating all
insured banks on the basis of five categories: capital, assets,
management, earnings and liquidity. Banksreceiving a ratingof four
or fiveon a scalefrom oneto five are placed on the problem bank
list, Our definition, which focuses on capital and asset quality, is
likely to provide a parallel indicator of banks threatened by bank-
ruptcyshould alarge shareofdelinquentloans become loan losses,
“.Melicharand Irwinhave reportedthat one-halfof potentianbyvulnera’
ble agricultural banks are located in five states: Iowa, Nebraska,
Kansas, Minnesota and Missouri; only Missouri is in the Eighth
District,
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l’nitlA — as alender of last m’esom’t, the EmbiA provides
an informal stnbsidv to the h”CS and agn’icuhtun’al banks
thin’ough its din’ect lending pn’ogn’ams. By lending in
sonic cases to farmer’s who had received h’CS or bank
financing hut who an’e rio longer’ consider’ed credit—
wor’ttiv, the F’mHAallows these lender’s to delay fore—
closur’e anid to continue to r’eceftc loan pavniienits fn’om
such horrowen’s, Moreover’, unden’ the Ecotioni ic
Emen’gencv Cn’edit Act, F’niHA n’efinanced loans on’igi—
nallv made hv the l-’CS and commercial ban ks and
n’epaid the on’iginal lender-s fn’om proceeds of the t”nil IA
loan.
Given the extneninelv high and rapidly gn’owinig dehin—
quencv r’ates on F’niFlA loans, one would expect. other’
things equal~to find comnienisur-atelv higher’ levels of
loani losses. Loami loss data for F’mh-IA farm loan pro—
grariis are available only on a consolidated basis Ii.e.,
farm ownen’ship and open’ating loani losses are niot
segn’egatedl. Chan’t 12, however’, shows low, ahthoughi
rising, rates of loan wr-ite—offs, F’on’ example, the 1984
delinquency rate on Frnl-tA fam’m ownien’ship loans was
near’ 25 pen’r.ent, hut only 0.22 percent of all Fm HA
toanis were charged off, ‘bEds contrasts with the II ii’:
1984 delinquency n‘ate of 3 pem’cetfl and loan n change
oft’s of 1.5 percent. ‘fhis discrepancy between instilu
tiomIs can be explained by thie gr’eaten- degn’ee of tor
hearance that the F’nnHA has exhibited with respect tm
its delinquent bor’n’owen’s, As e~idenceof this fom’hicar
ance. data on thie lengthi of time that loans are can’ned
in the delinquent stattns can be examined. While no
available on a Distn’ict scale, national Fm HAdata mdi
cate that, as ofJune 30, 1985, more than 45 pen’ceti I o
the volume of deliniquenit h-’ol-iA farm loans has been
in that status fon’ mom’e than foun’ year’s. UnIv 9 hien’cen
of the deluiquencies nationwide wen’e tess than onm
year past due.
C(.)NCLI.J Si{)~S
The Farm Cn’edit Svstern and agn’icultur’albanks rift
riot show substantial deten’ion’ation of loan portfoli(
quality until 1982. The FniHA, howeyem’, began to cx
hihit rising delinquency r’ates in 1979. ‘I’he deter-ion-a
tioni has been more pn’onounced among those lendern
Ct’.,, To
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who aggn’essivelv expanded their’ lending to agr’icul—
ture in the 1970s. In pam’ticular, the Federal Land Banks
of the Farm Cn’edit System expanded their mar-ket
shiar’e dur’ing the 1970s and experienced some of the
sham-pest declines in pon’tfolio quality in t’ecent years,
The niandate ofthe FCS to lend mainly to agn’icultun-al
intem’estsinhitiits its ability to diver-sii\’ its pon’tfohioand
n’aises the nisks associated with coneentn’ated lending
to one sector, Hence. sham-per- declines in overall port-
folio quality for’hin’anches ofthe F’CS, n-dative toagricul-
tural banks, took place. Finally, the data n’evealedlittle
ditl’en’enice in the measur-es of pom’tfolio quahit~orinsti-
tutional ean’nings at the Eighth Distn’ict and national
levels,
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